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Abstract
Twice a year FOMC members submit forecasts for growth,
unemplyoment and ination to be published in the Humphrey-
Hawkins Report to Congress. In this paper we use individual
FOMC forecasts to assess whether these forecasts exhibit herding
behavior, a pattern often found in private sector forecasts. While
growth and unemployment forecast do not show herding behavior,
the ination forecasts show strong evidence of anti-herding, i.e.
FOMC members intentionally scatter their forecasts around the
consensus. Interestingly, anti-herding is more important for non-
voting members than for voters.
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Members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal
Reserve not only set interest rates, but twice a year also submit forecasts
of core macroeconomic variables such as growth, unemployment and
ination. The range of these individual forecasts is eventually published
in the semi-annual Humphrey-Hawkins Report to Congress. While a vast
amount of research is devoted to the interest rate setting behavior of FOMC
members, much less is known about their forecasting behavior. This is a
severe shortcoming of the literature since the FOMC's own forecasts are,
besides those of the Federal Reserve sta collected in the Greenbook, an
important input for monetary policy decisions and a key factor in the Fed's
communication with the public. For example, Orphanides and Wieland
(2008) show that the FOMC's own projections are more important for
explaining interest rate decisions within a Taylor-rule framework than
observed macroeconomic outcomes. Until recently, however, an analysis
of FOMC forecasting was hampered by the non-availability of individual
forecast data. Fortunately, a new data set presented by Romer (2010) makes
these forecasts available for the period 1992-1998.
This paper is one of the rst attempts to study the forecasting behavior
of FOMC members. We evaluate the extent of herding behavior of FOMC
forecasts, a pattern often found in private sector forecasts (Pierdzioch et
al., 2010). We use a simple, yet powerful, statistical framework to study
whether an individual forecaster is aected by forecasts submitted by fellow
FOMC members. The FOMC forecasts are submitted simultaneously, but
members could revise their forecast after the meeting. If forecasts show an
intentional bias towards the consensus forecast, we refer to this outcome as
herding behavior. If, instead, forecasters systematically deviate from the
consensus forecast, their behavior is characterized as anti-herding. In this
case members submit exaggerated forecasts relative to the consensus.
Our results are threefold. First, FOMC members exhibit a strong degree
of anti-herding when submitting ination forecasts. Their forecasts of real
variables, however, show no signs of herding. Second, anti-herding is more
relevant for non-voting members. Third, we nd interesting patterns of
herding and anti-herding with respect to private sector forecasts. These
ndings corroborate the notion of strategic behavior of FOMC members
recently put forward by McCracken (2010) and others. FOMC members
appear to use their forecast to signal their policy preferences and to give the
debate on the FOMC additional spin.3
2 The Data Set
Twice a year at its February and July meetings the FOMC publishes the
monetary policy report to Congress (Humphrey-Hawkins report). For
this report, each FOMC member submits her own set of macroeconomic
forecasts. Until recently, however, individual forecasts were kept secret. The
published report only contains a range of forecasts and the midpoint of this
range, also known as the central tendency.1
Recently, the Fed makes data on individual FOMC forecasts available for
selected years. Based on these releases, Romer (2010) constructs a data set
containing forecasts for the period 1992-1998. The data set contains growth,
ination and unemployment forecasts from board members as well as from
voting and non-voting regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents. It does not,
however, contain forecasts from the chairman. In the July report, the FOMC
prepares forecasts ve quarters ahead and one quarter ahead. The February
report contains forecasts three quarters ahead. The ination forecast is the
expected fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter change of the Consumer Price
Index, while the unemployment and growth forecasts refer to the outcome in
the fourth quarter of the year. All forecasts are supposed to be conditional
on each member's own judgement of the "appropriate policy" path over the
forecast horizon. For each of the three dierent forecasts per year, the data
set contains forecasts for ination for seven years and 18 FOMC members.
We supplement the data set with forecasts from the private sector, which are
drawn from the Consensus Economic Forecast poll. During the rst week of
each month this survey asks professional forecasters about their projection
of the same variables as the FOMC with the same forecast horizon.
In order to examine the time-series dimension and the cross-sectional
dimension of the our data, Figures 1 to 3 plot the time series of (i) the
FOMC forecasts (dots), (ii) the actual realized values (solid line), and
(iii) the consensus forecast of the private sector (rectangles). The vertical
distance between the forecasts and the line can be interpreted as the forecast
error. Not surprisingly, the FOMC forecasts move in tandem with the
private sector consensus forecast. Another important information is that
the cross-sectional heterogeneity of FOMC forecasts is substantial. For
instance in February 1994 the growth (ination) forecasts vary across the
FOMC between 2:5 (2:25) and 3:8 (4) percent. Given this heterogeneity, the
following sections study in more detail individual FOMC forecasts and the
1These data received some attention in recent years (Gavin, 2003). Gavin and Mandal
(2003) compare forecast accuracy between the FOMC, the private sector, and the sta.
Gavin and Pande (2008) use data from the survey of professional forecasters to mimic the
FOMC's forecasting method and analyze dierent measures of forecast consensus.4
degree of herding behavior.2
Insert Figure 1 to 3 about here.
3 Testing for (Anti-)Herding
To uncover herding behavior of FOMC members, we use a test proposed by
Bernhardt et al. (2006).3 Their test is easy to implement, and the economic
interpretation of the results is straightforward. In order to illustrate how
the test works, it is useful to consider a forecaster who forms an "ecient"
private forecast. The forecaster derives her private forecast by applying her
"optimal" forecasting model using all information available. Her private
forecast, thus, will be unbiased and the probability that her private forecast
eventually overshoots or undershoots the future realized value should be 0.5.
The forecast submitted to her principal, in our case the FOMC, however, may
dier from her private forecast. One reason for a potential wedge between
the private forecast and the published forecast is that the latter is inuenced
by the "consensus" forecast which is dened as the arithmetic mean among
all other FOMC members.4 In the case of herding behavior of a forecaster,
her published forecast ~ st;t+h at time t for the period t + h (h = 1, 3 and 5
quarters) will be biased towards the consensus forecast  st;t+h. In case the
private forecast exceeds (falls short of) the consensus forecast, the published
forecast will be smaller (larger) than the private forecast, implying that the
probability of undershooting (overshooting) the realized value st+h is smaller
than 0:5, i.e.
P(st+h < ~ st;t+hS~ st;t+h >  st;t+h;st+h ≠ ~ st;t+h) < 0:5 (1)
and
P(st+h > ~ st;t+hS~ st;t+h <  st;t+h;st+h ≠ ~ st;t+h) < 0:5: (2)
In contrast, if a forecaster anti-herds, her published forecast will be further
away from the consensus forecast than her private forecast. The result is
2See Banternghansa and McCracken (2009) for a recent study on forecast disagreement
of FOMC members based on the Romer (2010) data set.
3The herding behavior of forecasters participating in the Consensus poll is subject of
a large literature. Using the same test, Pierdzioch et al. (2010) show that forecasters in
the housing market anti-herd.
4Hence, the consensus available to the FOMC member does not include his own forecast.
Results based on the median forecast, thus controlling for outliers, are qualitatively similar
and available upon request.5
that the probabilities of either undershooting or overshooting will be larger
than 0:5, i.e.
P(st+h < ~ st;t+hS~ st;t+h >  st;t+h;st+h ≠ ~ st;t+h) > 0:5 (3)
and
P(st+h > ~ st;t+hS~ st;t+h <  st;t+h;st+h ≠ ~ st;t+h) > 0:5: (4)
The test statistic, S, is dened as the average of the sample estimates
of the conditional probabilities. The null hypothesis of the test is that
the published forecasts are unbiased. Unbiased forecasts imply S = 0:5,
herding implies S < 0:5, and anti-herding implies S > 0:5. Bernhardt et al.
(2006) show that the test statistic, S, asymptotically has a normal sampling
distribution. They also demonstrate that the test is robust with respect to
correlated forecast errors, market-wide shocks, and collective optimism or
pessimism among forecasters.
Tables 1 to 4 report the results of the herding tests using the individual
forecasts of the FOMC with alternative measures of the consensus forecast.
Table 1 uses the consensus among all FOMC members. It turns out that
the FOMC does not (anti-)herd when forecasting the growth rate and the
unemployment rate. The ination forecasts, however, exhibit clear signs
of anti-herding with the S-statistic signicantly exceeding the value of 0:5.
Apparently, members intentionally scatter their projections away from the
consensus.
As mentioned before, the voting right rotates across of the regional Federal
Reserve Bank presidents, while the Federal Reserve Governors are always
allowed to vote.5 Table 2 uses all forecast horizons (h = 1, 3 and 5) but
disentangles the forecasting behavior of these two groups. The results
reveal that the anti-herding characterizing ination forecasts stems from
the behavior of non-voters. Voters, in contrast, submit unbiased forecasts.
This is consistent with the results presented by Tillmann (2010), who
nds that hawkish non-voters overpredict ination while dovish non-voters
systematically underpredict ination. In a similar vein, McCracken (2010)
argues that hawkish members have an incentive to forecast high ination
in order to support the need for tighter monetary policy. He nds that
5The President of the New York Fed does not participate in the rotation scheme. From
the remaining 11 regional Federal Reserve Banks, four Presidents are entitled to vote at
each point in time.6
for ination, the outlier-adjusted forecast range is more accurate than the
midpoint of the full range. Put dierently, controlling for outliers improves
the accuracy of the FOMC's ination forecast.
Table 3 supports this nding by replacing the FOMC consensus by the
consensus among the voting members. Again, the non-voters systematically
dierentiate their ination forecasts from those of voters. As a robustness
check, we replace the consensus among FOMC members by the consensus
of private sector forecasters taken from the Consensus Forecast poll which
is released one week before the FOMC meeting. These ndings are reported
in Table 4. Again, the FOMC members anti-herd when forecasting the
ination rate, but show no signs of herding behavior for the forecasts of real
variables.
Insert Tables 1 to 4 about here.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the forecast behavior of FOMC members using
a novel data set. While growth and unemployment forecast do not show
(anti-)herding behavior, the ination forecasts show strong evidence of anti-
herding, i.e. FOMC members intentionally scatter their forecasts around
the consensus. This result holds when either the FOMC's mean forecast or
private sector forecasts are used to represent the consensus view. Moreover,
anti-herding is more relevant for non-voting members than for voters.
These ndings are consistent with members following strategic motives when
submitting ination forecasts. In this sense FOMC members behave like pri-
vate sector forecasters. A crucial dierence, however, is that FOMC members
not only submit forecasts, but also set monetary policy in a way consistent
with these forecasts. The consequences of strategic forecasting for interest
rate setting are an interesting topic for future research once sucient forecast
data is made available to facilitate a rigorous empirical investigation.7
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Table 1: (Anti-)Herding within the FOMC
Variable Growth Ination Unemployment
Horizon h =1 h =3 h =5 h =1 h =3 h =5 h =1 h =3 h =5
S-statistic 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.54 0.50
Stand. Dev. 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Lower 90 % 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.46 0.42
Upper 90 % 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.62 0.58
Observations 120 120 120 108 110 114 105 116 118
Table 2: (Anti-)Herding of Voters and Non-Voters
Variable Growth Ination Unemployment
Status Voter Non-voter Voter Non-voter Voter Non-voter
S-statistic 0.53 0.52 0.57 0.64 0.55 0.56
Stand. Dev. 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03
Lower 90 % 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.59 0.47 0.50
Upper 90 % 0.61 0.57 0.65 0.70 0.62 0.62
Observations 125 236 114 214 118 221
Table 3: (Anti-)Herding of Non-Voters with Respect to Voters
Variable Growth Ination Unemployment
Horizon h =1 h =3 h =5 h =1 h =3 h =5 h =1 h =3 h =5
S-statistic 0.48 0.59 0.55 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.60 0.66 0.50
Stand. Dev. 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Lower 90 % 0.39 0.49 0.46 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.50 0.56 0.40
Upper 90 % 0.58 0.68 0.65 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.60
Observations 73 80 78 62 77 75 66 76 72
Table 4: (Anti-)Herding of the FOMC from the Consensus Economics Poll
Variable Growth Ination Unemployment
Horizon h =1 h =3 h =5 h =1 h =3 h =5 h =1 h =3 h =5
S-statistic 0.45 0.51 0.43 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.59 0.52 0.50
Stand. Dev. 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Lower 90 % 0.37 0.43 0.35 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.44 0.42
Upper 90 % 0.52 0.59 0.50 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.60 0.58
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Figure 3: Unemployment Forecasts
•FOMC; ◻ private sector consensus; realized value